Essay Grade

Transforming “Apathy Into Movement”:The
Role of Prosocial Emotions in Motivating
Action for Social Change
Emma F. Thomas
The Australian National University, Canberra
Craig McGarty
Murdoch University, Perth, Australia
Kenneth I. Mavor
The Australian National University, Canberra
This article explores the synergies between recent developments in the social identity of helping, and advantaged groups’ prosocial emotion. The authors review
the literature on the potential of guilt, sympathy, and
outrage to transform advantaged groups’ apathy into
positive action. They place this research into a novel
framework by exploring the ways these emotions shape
group processes to produce action strategies that emphasize either social cohesion or social change. These prosocial emotions have a critical but underrecognized role in
creating contexts of in-group inclusion or exclusion,
shaping normative content and meaning, and informing
group interests. Furthermore, these distinctions provide
a useful way of differentiating commonly discussed emotions. The authors conclude that the most “effective”
emotion will depend on the context of the inequality but
that outrage seems particularly likely to productively
shape group processes and social change outcomes.
Keywords:
I
emotion; social identity; helping/prosocial behavior; group processes; morality
n 1938, Carl Jung wrote, “There can be no transforming of darkness into light and of apathy into
movement without emotion” (p. 32). In this sentence,
Jung celebrates the profound role that emotion plays in
directing and shaping human behavior. Although individual emotion has long been a mainstay of clinical,
personality, and social psychological research (e.g., the
work of Ekman et al., 1987; Manstead & Fischer, 2001;
Scheff, 1990; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001, to
name a few), the advent of intergroup emotions theory
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie, Silver, &
Smith, 2004; Smith, 1993) signaled increasing interest in
the contribution that group-based emotion can add to
the study of social phenomena, including prejudice and
discrimination (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Smith, 1993),
social harmony and reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan,
2006), and social and political action (e.g., Iyer, Schmader,
& Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; van
Zomeren, Spears, Leach, & Fischer, 2004; see earlier
contributions from relative deprivation theory, Runciman,
1966; Walker & Smith, 2002, for a review).
This article concentrates on a specific aspect implied
in the Jung quote above: the power of emotion to transform “apathy into movement.” More specifically, this
article explores the transformation of an advantaged
group’s apathy into movement to promote greater social
equality. Following Leach, Snider, and Iyer (2002), we
define advantaged groups as those “secure in their position, due to their greater size or control over resources”
(p. 137). Thus, the scope of this article is defined by,
first, a focus on group emotion and, second, a focus on
emotions that advantaged group members experience in
relation to other people’s deprivation. We argue that it
is in this situation of relative advantage that the power
Authors’ Note: The research has been supported in part by the
Australian Research Council Discovery Project Grant No. DP0770731.
The authors wish to thank Galen Bodenhausen and two anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this
article. Please address correspondence to Emma F. Thomas, Regulatory
Institutions Network, The Australian National University, Canberra,
ACT, 0200, Australia; e-mail: emma.thomas@anu.edu.au.
PSPR, Vol. 13 No. 4, November 2009 310-333
DOI: 10.1177/1088868309343290
© 2009 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
310
Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   311
of emotion to transform apathy to action is most profound—what Nietzsche (quoted in Leach et al., 2002)
called “poisoning the consciences of the fortunate” (p.
136). Accordingly, this article explores the various emotional reactions that advantaged groups can have to the
disadvantage of others and the potential for these discrete emotions to motivate efforts to achieve greater
social equality.
We draw on recent developments in the social identity literature that outline the ways that social group
memberships shape prosocial behavior (e.g., helping
and solidarity; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, &
Levine, 2006) to provide a framework for understanding the various prosocial effects of group emotion.
Taking a social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner,
1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell,
1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), we
explore the ways that social identities and emotion can,
in combination, profoundly inform perceivers about the
social context and shape their reaction to it. We argue
that such an approach can help to differentiate oftenconfused emotion labels (e.g., sympathy and empathy)
but also provide a useful way to distinguish between
different prosocial strategies (e.g., tokenism, helping,
solidarity, cooperation).
We begin our analysis by outlining the developme­
nts in the social identity literature that detail the
underlying group processes responsible for producing
prosocial outcomes. In particular, Reicher et al. (2006)
have argued that there are three interrelated group
properties that are implicated in prosocial behavior.
We then go on to explore the ways that emotion may
theoretically shape these three prosocial group processes. In the next section, we move on to discuss the
possibility that prosocial emotions might usefully be
further classified on the basis of the sorts of social
strategies they promote. We draw on Wright and
Lubensky’s (2008) distinction between social cohesion
and social change strategies.
On the basis of these arguments, the main sections of
this article are underpinned by a framework that uses
Reicher et al.’s (2006) three categories to explore group
processes and emotion and Wright and Lubensky’s
(2008) two strategies to delineate prosocial emotion
outcomes. In particular, we provide an analysis of the
three prosocial emotions (guilt, sympathy, and outrage;
Montada & Schneider, 1989), structured in terms of the
etiology of the emotion; its implications for group processes (as relates to Reicher et al.’s, 2006, insights); and
the sorts of social strategy outcomes likely to emerge
(social cohesion or social change; Wright & Lubensky,
2008). We conclude with a discussion of implications
for existing research but also the implications for people
seeking to mobilize advantaged group members in support of positive social change.
SOCIAL IDENTITY AND GROUP EMOTION: A
DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
What sorts of identity processes underpin prosocial
behavior? Let us note at the outset that we are using the
general term prosocial to cover a number of separate
behaviors including helping behavior, altruism, cooperation, and solidarity (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder,
2005; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995).
These prosocial strategies will be differentiated throughout the article—indeed, it is one of the key purposes of
the article—but at this point, let us generalize across
them and explore the psychological underpinnings that
are generally understood to motivate an advantaged
group to help, assist, and otherwise take action on
behalf of members of another disadvantaged group. The
social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner
et al., 1987) suggests that there are three core processes
that underpin prosocial group behavior: category inclusion, category norms, and category interests. Reicher et
al. (2006) crystallized these three elements into their
social identity model of helping (see also Reicher,
Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005).
The first, category inclusion, is a cognitive perceptual
process that relates to the location of (inter)group
boundaries. A wealth of evidence now supports the assertion, derived from the social identity perspective, that
people will take action to support in-group members and
that this can manifest in intergroup helping (Levine &
Thompson, 2004; Reicher et al., 2006), political solidarity (Subašic´, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008), cooperation
between groups (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman,
& Rust, 1993), and even bystander emergency intervention (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine,
Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). In Reicher et al.’s
(2006) social identity model of helping, the first element
relates to the need for a meaningful superordinate categorization to be available, such that advantaged and
disadvantaged can be included in a common in-group.
In a similar vein, Subašic´ et al.’s (2008) recent model of
political solidarity emphasizes a shared identity meaning with the minority group (and not the authority) as
underpinning support for, and solidarity with, a disadvantaged minority.
The second element, category norms, relates to the
rhetorical meaning associated with the group, as evidenced by the group norms. When an identity is salient,
people will behave in line with group norms that prescribe
312   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW
appropriate and normative forms of action (Jetten,
McAuliffe, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2006; Jetten, Spears, &
Manstead, 1997; Terry & Hogg, 1996). Reicher et al.
(2006) argue that the group norms must promote helping. Their analysis of documents used to mobilize support of Bulgarian Jews during World War II demonstrated
the ways that the category norms for the Bulgarian identity prescribed support for a persecuted people.
The final element, category interests, relates to the
strategic concerns that accompany helping behavior. In
particular, Reicher et al. (2006) suggest that helping is
more likely to come about when in-group interests (e.g.,
maintenance of a positive in-group identity) are served
by helping. Thus, in the WWII era documents, identity
concerns were represented such that the Bulgarian ingroup would be threatened by not helping. Other
research has shown that group members can engage in
helping behavior to strategically improve the group’s
stereotype (Hopkins et al., 2007) and/or restore a
threatened identity (van Leeuwen, 2007).
Overall, Reicher and colleagues argue that effective
categories will be those that are able to include everyone
whom one is seeking to mobilize (category inclusion)
but also those categories that have the resources to
render normative the actions one is advocating (category norms) and represent the strategic reasons for
doing so (category interests). However, the social identity approach also emphasizes the fluid, dynamic, and
constructed nature of social identity (Onorato & Turner,
2004). Other work by Reicher, Haslam, and colleagues
(e.g., Reicher, 1996, 2004; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins,
2005) has highlighted the ways that social identities are
contested by group members, yielding a continual process of identity construction, reconstruction, and transformation through consensus (see also Postmes, Haslam,
& Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005).
Put another way, the category inclusion, category norms,
and category interest elements discussed by Reicher and
colleagues are also dynamic, contestable, changeable,
and fundamentally shaped through processes of argumentation and consensualization among group members (Reicher et al., 2006). Building on these insights, in
this article we explore the ways that emotions can powerfully shape the social identity processes outlined by
Reicher et al. (2006) and others (Hopkins et al., 2007;
Levine et al., 2005; Subašic´ et al., 2008; van Leeuwen,
2007). We argue that exploring the synergies between
group emotion, and the sorts of identity processes outlined above would contribute much to our understanding of prosocial group behavior.
For group emotion to contribute usefully to our understanding of the dynamic processes of identity construction, reconstruction, and transformation, it is necessary
to have a dynamic theory of group emotion. Indeed, the
existing literature on social identity and group emotion
suggests that the causal relationships between the two
are likely to be bidirectional, dynamic, and complex
(Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Smith & Mackie, 2006).
Consistent with these points, Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall,
and Zhang (2007) have emphasized the role of anticipation, reevaluation, and reconstruction in the emotion
process, whereas Smith and Mackie (2006) have discussed the ways that group members can, over time,
disengage with groups that elicit negative group emotions. Let us briefly discuss this literature, toward further clarifying the dynamic causal properties of social
identity and group emotion.
On one hand, group emotion is often theoretically
understood as stemming from the straightforward appr­
aisal process elaborated in intergroup emotion theory,
where appraisal based on a group (social) self leads to
group emotion, which leads to group action (Mackie
et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). Similarly, in the recently
articulated social identity model of collective action
(SIMCA; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008),
these authors causally place a salient social identity
before the experience of emotional reactions to injustice
(group emotion). Figure 1a depicts the simple causal
model where a salient social identity leads to congruent
group emotions, which then shape particular action
strategies. This is group-based emotion, as it is traditionally defined and understood (Iyer & Leach, 2008;
Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007), where social identities
are (partially) enacted through an emotion pathway
(van Zomeren et al., 2008).
On the other hand, we argue that it is also useful to
explore the ways that emotions can equally give rise to
social group memberships and/or inform group norms.
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that social identities
can be actively created by group members based on
shared cognition (where shared cognition refers to shared
knowledge structures; Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, &
Spears, 2007). In a similar vein, Peters and Kashima
(2007) have described the ways that the social sharing
of emotion can create links among people and foster a
shared understanding of the world. This shared understanding can be used to coordinate social interaction
within a group but also action between groups (Leach
& Tiedens, 2004; Peters & Kashima, 2007; Smith et al.,
2007). Figure 1b depicts this simple causal model where
emotion can form the basis for an effective social category, which then motivates social action. Given that we
propose that group formation can stem from emotional
experience, it seems likely that perception is personalized, or individuated, in this context (which is different
from how group emotion is traditionally defined and
Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   313
1a: salient social self (social identity) gives rise to group emotion.
Social
Identity
Group
Emotion
Social
Action
1b: recognition of shared emotion precipitates group formation.
(Individual)
Emotion
Social
Identity
Social
Action
Figure 1 A dynamic causal model of social identity and group emotion.
NOTE: In everyday social interaction, the two processes would be
interactive.
understood; Iyer & Leach, 2008). That is, the emotion
is initially experienced at an individual level, but the recognition that others share the emotion forms the basis for
group formation (see Peters & Kashima, 2007). We further
articulate some of the implications of this causal order
below where we consider how group emotion might
shape the processes outlined by Reicher et al. (2006).
Thus, on the basis of the available literature, both
causal orderings seem likely and plausible in the everyday
social context of group emotion and identity. Consistent
with these points, Kessler and Hollbach (2005) emphasized the bidirectionality of causal links between emotion and identification. Elsewhere (Thomas, McGarty,
& Mavor, 2009), we have argued that these elements
are best seen as part of a dynamic system of interrelations, where causal ordering will vary over time and
depending on social context. In particular, we argued
that a shared group membership can give rise to, or
facilitate, the experience of group emotion and other
action-relevant beliefs (as in Figure 1a; see Mackie et al.,
2000; van Zomeren et al., 2008), as may be the case in
established, historical social groups, but that, similarly,
those emotional experiences can also trigger psychological group formation and subsequently become
encapsulated in “what it means” to be a group member
(Turner, 1991), as may be the case of incipient, emergent social groups (Figure 1b). Such ideas are also
broadly consistent with recent developments exploring
the role of individuality within the group, which have
emphasized the ways that individuality can shape emergent groups (as in Figure 1b) and groups shape individuals (as in Figure 1a) (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab,
2005; Postmes & Jetten, 2006). Thus, incorporating
these different causal orderings is consistent with the
dynamic, iterative, transformational, and constructed
nature of social identity described above.
Given these points, what are the ways that group
emotion can contribute to our understanding of the
three interrelated processes outlined by Reicher et al.
(2006)? We argue that the experience of emotion can
fundamentally inform the perceiver about the social
context by (a) providing a basis on which to categorize
in-group members or out-group members based on
whether the emotion is shared or not; (b) informing the
content, and relational meaning, of the identity; and
(c) shaping the ways that group members take strategic
action. These are the three general processes considered
most important in the work outlined above on social
identity and helping (Reicher et al., 2006). Let us consider each of these points in more detail.
Category Inclusion
With regard to the first component, category inclusion, we argue that advantaged groups’ emotions have
the potential to shape and restructure (inter)group
boundaries. For example, experiencing feelings of fear
in relation to another person is unlikely to lead to a
categorization of that person as an in-group member;
the very fact that someone elicits a fearful reaction is
indicative of a different worldview and antagonistic
relationship (Bar-Tal, 2001; Turner, 2005). Conversely,
experiencing the same emotion is more likely to give rise
to a perception of the other person as an in-group member (see Peters & Kashima’s, 2007, work on emotion
sharing; Swaab et al., 2007). Extending on this point,
we argue that some emotions have the potential to
traverse ostensible intergroup boundaries. Because emotions can assist in creating a shared worldview and uniting previously separate groups in coordinated social
action (Peters & Kashima, 2007), then it follows that
emotions that can be experienced by both the advantaged and the disadvantaged are likely to be more successful at motivating genuine attempts to create intergroup
equality and cooperation.
Category Norms
Emotions can also inform group members about the
reasons for, and context of, disadvantage and, in doing
so, can powerfully shape normative considerations
(the second component). For example, group guilt is
understood to be accompanied by appraisals of ingroup responsibility (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty,
2002). To the extent that perceptions of in-group
responsibility become embodied in the group membership (in relation to the disadvantage suffered by the
other group), then this emotion is likely to inform
norms for specific sorts of action. The idea that an
emotional reaction can inform relational meaning, or
normative content, of an identity is contained in the
arguments of Stürmer, Simon, and Klandermans (Simon
& Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, in press).
314   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW
These authors argue that anger plays a powerful role
in politicizing a social identity, transforming the identity such that it is more ready for social action. Thus,
to the extent that anger becomes normatively engaged
with the identity, this will engender particular sorts of
normative action (usually surrounding political
action).
There also is converging evidence that it may be fruitful to explore emotions as normative processes themselves (Smith et al., 2007; Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom,
in press; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). In other words, it
is possible that the emotion overall will shape group
memberships both directly (by shaping behavior norms)
and indirectly (by shaping emotion norms).
Category Interests
Finally, related to the points above, emotions will
shape the sorts of strategies that group members prefer
(category interests), in particular depending on where
the emotion implies that blame lies (one of the key
appraisal components; Lazarus, 1991). Emotions will
also inform the perceiver about the (group) self-relevant
strategic dimensions to the inequality. For example, as
we will argue below, moral outrage is likely to make
strategic representations concerning the need to restore
a moral status quo, whereas empathy is likely to represent category interests based on a perceived interchangeability between self and other.
Nadler and Liviatan (2006) have also explored the
ways in which emotions themselves can be deployed
tactically, to aid in promoting intergroup cooperation,
reconciliation, or conflict. Thus, it seems that, just as
groups can be strategic about their behavior in the helping context (Hopkins et al., 2007; Reicher et al., 2006;
van Leeuwen, 2007), it can be beneficial for both the
intergroup relationship and the disadvantaged group in
particular if they can be equally tactical about the ways
they express themselves.
Overall, then, we argue that incorporating an understanding of group emotion has much to contribute to
our understanding of the dynamic social identity
processes and prosocial behavior outlined by Reicher
and colleagues. We acknowledge, though, that we are
far from the first to make such points; indeed, it was
similar arguments concerning the potential for emotion to usefully capture and differentiate group processes that motivated E. R. Smith, Mackie, and
colleagues (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie et al., 2004;
Smith, 1993; Smith & Ho, 2002) to develop intergroup emotion theory in the first place. Rather, our
concern is that group emotion is sometimes explored
in rather static ways. Thus, our point is to reenergize
a focus on the ways in which emotions can shape and
reshape group boundaries and transform subjective
group memberships, to promote either action or apathy. We pursue these points with regard to prosocial
emotion and behavior.
THE PROSOCIAL EMOTIONS
Appraisal theory, on which intergroup emotion theory is based, makes it clear that emotional reactions are
premised on a basic process of appraising, or evaluating, features in the environment. For something to be
appraised, it must first be observed (Frijda, 1993;
Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). However,
Leach et al. (2002) have explored the ways that members of advantaged groups can go to great lengths to
either minimize or completely ignore their own privilege. Only when the advantage is recognized, with the
associated emotion, is the potential for promoting social
equality greatest (Leach et al., 2002).
It is also clear that not all feelings of relative advantage will produce a reaction designed to overcome the
inequality and promote action to bring about positive
social change. For example, disdain is unlikely to motivate positive prosocial behavior (Leach et al., 2002).
Given the broad range of emotions that can be experienced in situations of relative advantage, Leach and colleagues (Leach et al., 2002), drawing on work by Montada
and Schneider (1989), differentiated four appraisal dimensions on which feelings of relative advantage might be
differentiated: the extent to which the advantaged are
focused on themselves (self) or on the disadvantaged
(other); the perceived legitimacy of the privilege; the perceived stability of the advantage; and the degree of perceived control that the advantaged have over their
position. Overall, the emotion that is experienced in the
face of relative advantage is a function of the structure
of the intergroup relations, along the four dimensions
(see also Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008).
In this work (Leach et al., 2002; Montada &
Schneider, 1989) and in that on interpersonal emotion
(Feather, 2006; Lazarus, 1991), there are understood to
be three primary prosocial emotions implicated in a
desire to help another: guilt, sympathy, and moral outrage. The first goal of this article is to provide a review
of what is known about each of these emotions in motivating positive group-level action. That is, what role
does each of these play in turning apathy into social
action on behalf of another group? We also expand the
analysis of these three prosocial emotions to include
two additional, related emotions that can also be associated with prosocial outcomes: empathy and (self-focused) anger. Thus, we argue that there are three general
categories of prosocial emotion: guilt; sympathy and
Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   315
empathy; and anger and outrage. Leach et al. (2002)
provided an overview of these emotions; however, the
subsequent proliferation of research on these emotions
makes an updated review timely.
As suggested, a second goal of this article is to explore
the ways that these same prosocial emotions might shape
and restructure intergroup boundaries, to produce different prosocial strategies to reduce inequality. Advantaged
groups can use a range of social strategies to “help” or
provide assistance to the disadvantaged; however, not
all of these are premised on a genuine desire to change
the status quo (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004; Nadler,
2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Wright & Lubensky,
2008; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Indeed,
Wright and Lubensky (2008; see also Wright, Kiu,
Semenya, & Comeau, 2008) explored the differences
between the collective action and prejudice reduction
literatures, arguing that the two traditions have resulted
in antithetical approaches to the question of addressing
social inequality. Wright and Lubensky (2008) broadly
differentiate the strategies preferred by the two literatures thus: “The prejudice reduction approach focuses
on themes of intergroup harmony and social cohesion. . . . The collective action perspective speaks in
terms of equality across groups, not harmony between
groups, and focuses on social justice” (p. 306). We draw
broadly on this critical distinction between approaches
that attempt to address inequalities by creating social
cohesion and those strategies that attempt to address
inequalities by achieving social justice and social change.
In this article, we are particularly interested in those
social strategies that are likely to bring about a change
in the social status of historically (or incidentally) disadvantaged groups. From our perspective, genuine social
change is about redressing social inequality at a group
level; thus, we are less interested in those approaches
that might elevate individuals of disadvantaged groups
(as in tokenism) but without changing the status of the
group as a whole.
Thus, we consider the ways in which the three categories of prosocial emotion act to (re)structure group
boundaries and shape group processes and the different
forms of prosocial strategies (broadly, social cohesion or
social change) that may result. Emotion that is shared
with others can create a shared understanding of the
world (Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Peters & Kashima,
2007). Accordingly, our key argument throughout is that
the most effective emotion (to mirror Reicher et al.’s,
2006, discussion of effective categories) is likely to be
one that (a) can be shared by both the advantaged and
disadvantaged, (b) will direct normative forms of social
and political action, and (c) strategically recognizes the
expertise and experience of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In other words, if the goal is genuine
social cooperation toward positive social change, rather
than top-down paternalistic assistance (Nadler, 2002;
Nadler & Halabi, 2006), it may be more fruitful to
explore emotions that both the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups can experience. In exploring this
proposition, we propose new ways of conceptualizing
the differences between two sets of often-confused emotions at a group level: sympathy and empathy; outrage
and anger.
Given these two goals, in what follows we will first
provide a review of the relevant literature relating to
group-based emotions: guilt, sympathy and empathy,
and anger and moral outrage, respectively. For each of
these emotions, we will then consider the ways that the
emotion might affect group boundaries, and the relational meaning of the social identities. We then conclude
by exploring the sorts of prosocial strategies that group
emotions seem likely to promote. Our overall analysis of
each of these emotions can be seen in Figure 2, which
depicts each of the prosocial emotions that are the focus
in this article, the ways that they shape group processes,
and the specific sorts of social strategies likely to
emerge. It also organizes each emotion under the Wright
and Lubensky (2008) social cohesion or social change
framework.
GUILT
Etiology
Broadly, guilt arises from internalized values about
right and wrong (Lazarus, 1991). At an individual
appraisal level, it centers around actions (or imagined
actions) that we regard as morally reprehensible and the
appraisal pattern is characterized by a moral transgression, for which there is blame to the self (Lazarus,
1991). Group-level guilt has been shown to be similar
in nature to individual-level guilt; however, the self that
has committed the transgression is a social self (see
Turner et al., 1994). Consistent with a group-level perspective of guilt, there is good evidence that people can
feel guilt based on their social group memberships
(Branscombe & Doosje, 2004).
Doosje et al. (1998, Study 1) used minimal groups to
show that it is possible to induce guilt in people even
though their personal self was not responsible for the
harm inflicted on another. There is a large literature on
the experience of guilt, in particular “White guilt,” in
relation to the historical mistreatment and continuing
inequality in the context of the White American treatment of African Americans (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby,
2003; Iyer et al., 2004; Swim & Miller, 1999), the
Dutch colonial treatment of Indonesians (Doosje et al.,
1998; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2004), and the White
316   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW
SOCIAL COHESION
GUILT
SOCIAL CHANGE
(SELF-FOCUSED) ANGER
Advantaged
group
Tokenism
Disadvantaged
group
Advantaged
group
Regulation
Disadvantaged
group
SYMPATHY
Advantaged
group
OUTRAGE
Paternalism
System, government,or third party
Disadvantaged
group
Social
and
political
action
EMPATHY
Advantaged
Disadvantaged
group
group
Cooperation
Figure 2
Disadvantaged
group
Advantaged
group
Solidarity
The prosocial emotions and group processes as a function of social cohesion or social change strategies.
Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   317
Australian mistreatment of Indigenous Australians
(Branscombe et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2006; McGarty
& Bliuc, 2004; McGarty et al., 2005; Pedersen, Beven,
Walker, & Griffiths, 2004). Furthermore, there is related
research on the atrocities committed against Jewish
people during the Second World War (Wohl &
Branscombe, 2004, 2005), the American and British
occupation of Iraq (Iyer et al., 2007), and gender inequality between men and women (Branscombe, 1998;
Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004; Schmitt,
Ellemers, & Branscombe, 2003).
What of cases where the group is not responsible for
the disadvantage of another group? People in developed
nations could hardly be held responsible for the disadvantage experienced by people in developing nations,
yet members of developed countries often report feeling
guilty about their advantage. Hoffman (1976) coined
the term existential guilt to describe the emotional experience of feeling guilty about mere, unearned advantages that one group has ove